报告题目：Does Soft-close Eliminate Sniping in Online Auctions? An Attention-based Explanation

报告所属学科：应用经济学

报告人：曹志刚（北京交通大学）

报告时间：2023年6月7日 9:00-12:00

报告地点：腾讯会议：407120368

报告摘要：

Whether soft-close ending rule eliminates sniping (i.e., bidding as late as possible) and its adverse consequences is a long-lasting concern to the field of online auctions. This paper examines the effectiveness of soft-close in online English auctions when attention poses a true challenge. We find that sniping remains the best reply when naive bidders have limited attentions. Its winning probability and winning price monotonously decrease as the naive bidder becomes more attentive and as the softening horizon increases. Using a unique setting large-scale data from Alibaba Judicial Auction, we find sniping works under soft-close, and evidence consistent with the comparative statics. We preclude several alternative explanations and conclude that inattention is perhaps the most reasonable explanation for why soft-close does not work perfectly in online English auctions. (joint work with Yunlong Wang, Xiaoguang Yang and Lin Zhao)

报告人简介：

曹志刚，北京交通大学经济管理学院教授。2010年毕业于中科院数学与系统科学研究院并留院任助理研究员。2017年9月加盟北京交通大学经济管理学院，任“卓越百人计划”教授。长期从事合作博弈、交通博弈、网络博弈和算法博弈等方面的研究，在包括Operations Research、Mathematics of Operations Research、Games and Economic Behavior、Journal of Mathematical Economics、Social Choice and Welfare、International Journal of Game Theory和《中国科学：数学》在内的期刊上发表多篇论文。相关成果曾获中国信息经济学理论贡献奖、系统科学与系统工程青年科技奖、中国决策科学青年科技奖和关肇直青年研究奖等荣誉。先后主持国家自然科学基金委的青年、面上和优青项目。兼任中国“双法”研究会智能决策与博弈分会副理事长，中国运筹学会博弈论分会副理事长，中国双法学会青年工作委员会副秘书长、网络科学分会副秘书长，中国信息经济学会常务理事和中国运筹学会理事等职务。