报告题目：A novel mechanism for private parking space sharing: the VCG auction with scale control

报告所属学科：管理科学与工程 

报告人：徐素秀（北京理工大学）

报告时间：2023年4月8日 10:00-11:30

报告地点：经管学院702室

报告摘要：

There can be many vacant private parking spaces near locations of excess parking demand. How can we provide the right incentives to potential suppliers and demanders so that they are shared in the market? We consider a parking-sharing platform in which each agent supplies a parking space and needs another one. We propose a novel parking-sharing mechanism that amends the well-known Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction with the notion of scale control, which ex-ante constrains the number of agents who are offered a parking space by the platform. We show that such a mechanism is incentive compatible and individually rational. We illustrate that it can easily achieve budget balance with a proper choice of scale. We also extend our auction to include only suppliers and only demanders in addition to the agents who are simultaneously suppliers and demanders.

报告人简介：

徐素秀，男，北京理工大学管理与经济学院教授、博导、特立青年学者。2008年哈尔滨工业大学数学系获理学学士学位，2014年香港大学工业及制造系统工程系获工学博士学位。任中国管理科学与工程学会交通运输管理分会委员，中国工程院院刊Frontiers of Engineering Management特约通讯专家，SSCI/ABS期刊RAE-Journal of Business Management副编辑，Journal of Intelligent Manufacturing、Journal of Advanced Transportation等SCI期刊客座编辑。研究兴趣包括交通经济学、拍卖与机制设计、博弈与供应链管理、优化理论与算法等。主持2项国家自然科学基金项目（青年基金后评估为“特优”），入选2017年广东省“珠江人才计划”青年拔尖人才。出版学术专著1部，发明专利授权1项、受理实审3项，在POM、TS、TR Part A/B/C/E、IISE、IJPE、IJPR、IEEE T-ASE、AOR、CIE等权威SCI/SSCI期刊发表论文50余篇，在《系统管理学报》、《交通运输系统工程与信息》、《工业工程》等权威中文期刊发表论文多篇。近五年来，谷歌学术累计引用超过一千次，研究成果获IISE Transactions期刊年度最佳论文奖、江苏省第十七届哲学社会科学优秀成果奖。